CAN HEDGING AFFECT FIRM VALUE? AN OIL, GAS AND MINING PERSPECTIVE by Da Costa, J. Carlos L. & Singh, Jaspal
 
 
 
CAN HEDGING AFFECT FIRM VALUE?  
AN OIL, GAS AND MINING PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
by 
 
J. Carlos L. da Costa 
Bachelor of Commerce, Concordia University, 1997 
Master of Science in Financial Markets and Derivatives, London Guildhall University, 2000 
 
and 
 
Jaspal Singh 
Bachelor of Business Administration, University of the Fraser Valley, 2011 
 
 
 
PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN FINANCE 
 
 
In the Master of Science in Finance Program 
of the 
Faculty of Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
© J. Carlos L. da Costa and Jaspal Singh, 2013 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
Fall 2013 
 
 
 
All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work may be reproduced, without 
authorization, under the conditions for Fair Dealing. Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private 
study, research, criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, particularly if cited appropriately.
 i 
 
Approval 
 
Names:      J. Carlos L. da Costa 
Jaspal Singh 
 
Degree:      Master of Science in Finance 
 
Title of Project:  Can Hedging Affect Firm Value? An Oil, Gas and 
Mining Perspective 
 
Supervisory Committee: 
 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
Dr. Christina Atanasova 
Senior Supervisor 
Associate Professor, Finance 
 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
Dr. Evan Gatev 
Second Reader 
Associate Professor, Finance 
 
 
 
Date Approved:     __________________________________________ 
 ii 
 
Can Hedging Affect Firm Value? 
An Oil, Gas and Mining Perspective 
 
Abstract 
 
Our paper investigates the impact of financial hedging on the firm value of a sample of 
mining, oil and gas companies that are publicly listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
Employing a Tobin’s Q model for the sample of companies, the study finds that hedging 
does not significantly affect a firm’s valuation while other financial factors impact it in a 
statistically and economically significant manner. The results add further evidence to the current 
research literature that has reported contradictory empirical findings from prior research. 
Our observations are consistent with the school of thought that the firm valuation effect 
associated with hedging is insignificant. In these resource sectors, commodity price exposure is 
transparent and easy to hedge by investors, so there is no reason to expect that oil, gas and 
mining companies hedging their production price risk(s) should have higher firm values. 
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Can Hedging Affect Firm Value? 
An Oil, Gas & Mining Perspective 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Berkman et al. (1996); Bodnar et al., (1996), (1998) have found that since the 1980s, non-
financial firms have increasingly hedged their market risk exposure in relation to commodities, 
equities, foreign exchange, and interest rates by utilizing various financial derivative instruments. 
Merton (1993) classifies risk management strategies according to three different types of risk 
reduction: hedging, insurance and diversification. 
A hedge is a risk management strategy used to reduce any substantial losses suffered by 
an individual or an organization. A hedge can be constructed from many types of financial 
instruments, including stocks, insurance, forward contracts, swaps, options, many types of over-
the-counter and derivative products, and futures contracts. The act of hedging is the practice of 
taking a position in one market or investment to offset and balance against the risk adopted by 
assuming a position in a contrary or opposing market or investment. 
Many hedges do not involve the usage of financial instruments. A natural hedge is an 
investment that reduces the undesired risk of adverse market conditions by matching cash flows. 
For example, an automobile exporter to Canada faces a risk of changes in the value of the 
Canadian dollar and chooses to open a production facility in Ontario so its costs will be 
denominated in the same currency as the firm’s sales revenue. 
Another example is a company that opens a subsidiary in a different country and borrows 
in the foreign currency to finance its operations, even though the foreign interest rate may be 
higher than in its home country. By matching the debt payments to expected revenues in the 
foreign currency, the parent company has reduced its foreign currency exposure. Similarly, an oil 
producer may expect to receive its revenues in U.S. dollars, but faces costs in a different 
currency; the entity would be applying a natural hedge if it agreed to, for example, pay bonuses 
to employees in U.S. dollars. 
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Insurance refers to strategies that eliminate the potential for downside risk while keeping 
the upside potential. Hedging, therefore, refers to financial contracts with a linear payoff function 
while insurance denotes contracts with non-linear payoff. Diversification is the strategy to 
engage in a wider range of activities and thereby reducing the dependence on any single activity. 
There has been ongoing debates whether hedging, often in the form of financial 
derivatives usage, is an appropriate strategy or more speculative. Stulz (1996) observes that 
companies engage in some speculation because they allow their outlook on the future to impact 
how they manage market risks. The size of this effect is, however, uncertain and there is 
evidence that supports the view that the effect is insignificant on average. Géczy et al. (1997) 
noticed that companies with currency risk exposures appear to engage in rational currency 
contracts usage, thus supporting the opinion that entities are hedging instead of speculating. We 
will therefore assume that firms are hedging rationally and that speculation has an insignificant 
impact on the results. 
Kim et al. (2006) report that there are two types of hedging strategies, financial and 
operational hedging. Financial hedging is an investment strategy whose purpose is to offset 
probable losses that may be incurred by some risk factors, such as price risks, liquidity risks, 
credit risks or even natural disaster risks, through using many types of financial instruments. 
Conversely, operational hedging is the strategy that hedges a firm’s risk exposure by means of 
non-financial instruments, particularly through operational activities. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) or multinational enterprises (MNEs) will engage in 
operational hedging only when both exchange rate and demand uncertainty are present 
(Chowdhry and Howe, 1999). Operational hedging is less important for managing short-term 
exposures since demand uncertainty is lower in the interim. Operational hedging is also less 
significant for commodity-based firms that face price, but not quantity, uncertainty. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) mention that the motive behind the usage of financial derivative 
instruments is that hedging can reduce the transaction cost of financial distress and decrease the 
level of tax obligation. Their research goes on to highlight that managerial risk aversion can also 
be one of the objectives for hedging. They determine that market imperfections make market 
hedging a value enhancement strategy. Froot et al. (1993) suggest that hedging can also offset 
the underinvestment issue and it can also affect the marketplace’s perception about the capability 
 3 
 
of managerial executives based on hedging and firm performance. Conversely, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) comment that financial policies cannot change a firm’s value in the lack of market 
failures which indicates that there would virtually be no incentive for firms to adopt hedging 
policies including those that utilize derivatives strategies. 
It can be observed that exploring the relation between hedging and a MNC’s value has 
increasingly become a matter of interest to many academics and practitioners. The existing 
literature regarding the relationship between firm value and financial hedging show some 
inconsistent results. Allayannis and Weston (2001) report that companies that establish a 
financial hedging policy experience a rise in firm value above their competitors that decide to 
stay unhedged or those who choose to abandon their hedging mandates. Moreover, Carter et al. 
(2006) claim that airlines using jet fuel whose prices are volatile benefit from the hedging 
premium. Jin and Jorion (2006), in contrast, report that there is usually no change in firm value 
between MNCs that hedge and those that do not. Fauver and Naranjo (2010) observed that in the 
presence of agency costs and monitoring problems the usage of financial derivatives has an 
adverse effect on firm value. 
Our research focuses on analyzing whether or not hedging using financial derivatives 
enhances the value of firms and the possible reasons for our observations. 
We applied four limitations to our study. First, we did not distinguish between different 
types of risk reduction. Second, we ignored how much or by which means hedging should be 
performed. Third, we did not discuss what exposures should be hedged. Finally, we assumed that 
hedging was undertaken rationally and that speculation was of marginal importance. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: (i) Section II examines a number of relevant 
literature research and earlier empirical evidence on the factors of corporate hedging and key 
findings on hedging and firm value; (ii) Sections III and IV present the applied methodology, 
data analysis and empirical results; and (iii) Section V reports our findings and conclusions. 
 
 
 4 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
According to traditional finance theory, in the absence of market imperfections, financial 
hedging does not impact a firm’s value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). We proceed by examining 
empirical studies that investigate why firms hedge by starting from the assumptions underlying 
the Modigliani-Miller (MM) propositions. We will relax them, one-by-one, and investigate their 
corresponding effect(s) on hedging incentives. Theory and empirical evidence reviewed in this 
thesis suggest that corporate entities hedge because some of the MM assumptions do not hold. 
Specifically, to have an increased debt capacity and thereby enabling a larger interest tax shield 
and the fact that external financing is costly appear to be important motives why they hedge. 
Modern finance theory puts risk in the center. It identifies a few market imperfections 
that can make volatility costly. They are summarized as follows: 
i. Taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998): If firms’ effective 
marginal tax rates are an increasing function of their pre-tax value then the after-
tax value of the entity is a convex function of its pre-tax value. Thus, if hedging 
decreases the variability of pre-tax firm values then the projected corporate tax 
liability is decreased and the anticipated post-tax value of the entity is increased 
providing the price of the financial hedge is not overly large. The greater the 
convexity of the corporate tax liability the greater the effectiveness of the hedge is 
so long as the hedging charges do not surpass the benefits of the hedge. 
ii. Financial distress costs (Myers, 1977; Smith and Stulz, 1985): Hedging can 
decrease the probability that the company encounters financial distress through 
the reduction of the variance of its firm value, and thus decreases the expected 
costs of financial distress. The size of the entity also affects its motivation to 
hedge. For instance, financial distress can lead to bankruptcy and reorganization 
or liquidation which results in direct legal costs. Warner (1977) found that a 
firm’s legal costs of financial distress are less than proportional to its size which 
suggests that small companies are more likely to hedge. Conversely, the costs of 
bankruptcy are a small fraction of a large firm’s total assets. This implies that they 
can hedge by affording weighty information and transaction cost scale economies. 
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iii. Managerial risk aversion costs (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985): If a large 
fraction of an MNE is owned by management, one can expect it to hedge more 
frequently as the executives’ wealth is increasingly a linear function of its value. 
Moreover, researchers suggest that risk-averse executives whose compensation 
packages hinges on the firm’s accounting earning and economic value are more 
likely to implement an active hedging policy since shareholders design 
management’s compensation packages as a concave function of the firm’s value. 
iv. Costly external financing (Froot et al., 1993): Risk management theories that 
highlight costly external financing emphasize on the cash flow volatility as the 
risk measure to be hedged. For instance, Froot et al. mention that if external 
financing is costlier than internal financing, hedging can be a value-increasing 
tactic if it more closely matches fund inflows with outflows, thus decreasing the 
possibility that an MNC needs to access the capital markets. 
These papers offer an insight into some of the motives for hedging market risk. The 
mentioned incentives are viewed as the fundamental factors related to firm value. 
Froot et al. also observed that the more correlated a firm’s cash flows are with future 
investment opportunities, the greater the likelihood it will hedge. They determined that hedging 
can explain the underinvestment problem by decreasing cash flow unpredictability so as to 
finance the project which possesses a positive net present value. Froot et al. go on to mention 
that nonlinear financial derivatives instruments (i.e.: options) will normally permit companies to 
synchronize financing and investment plans with greater precision than with linear financial 
instruments (i.e.: forwards and futures). A MNC’s hedging strategies are dependent on a number 
of factors such as the currency risk exposure of both investment disbursements and incomes. 
They also note that the optimum hedging strategy for a firm will hinge on both the nature of 
product market competition and on the hedging policies adopted by its corporate rivals. 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein’s (1993) research not only examines and explains a 
company’s incentives behind financial hedging but it also offers responses to questions such as 
“What types of risks should be mitigated?”, “Should such risks be partially or fully hedged?”, 
and “What kind of financial instruments will achieve the hedging objectives?” The conclusion 
presented by Froot et al. compliments and adds to the findings of Smith and Stulz (1982). 
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Other incentives exist as to why a company hedges. Nance et al. (1993) suggest that 
investing in less risky, more liquid and/or imposing dividend restrictions are all alternatives for 
hedging. Higher asset liquidity and/or the lower its dividend yield can ensure that an MNC is 
able to repay its debt to creditors, thus decreasing the likelihood of financial distress. Kalay 
(1982) also finds that implementing dividend restrictions can ease the insufficient amount of 
investment problem. Nance et al. (1993) also show that entities can lower the possibility of 
financial distress by issuing preferred shares (“preferreds”) rather than debt, as preferreds cannot 
cause insolvency. They also remark that the size of the company impacts whether or not it 
hedges. The explanations offered by Nance et al. are similar to those expressed by Smith and 
Stulz (1985). Nance et al. also mention that smaller companies are more likely to have taxable 
income in the progressive region of the tax schedule, which implies that these entities are more 
inclined to hedge than their larger counterparts. 
Tufano (1996) mentions that researchers have assigned two categories to classify the 
motives behind hedging. The first one is the stockholder maximization hypothesis. This theory 
states that by decreasing the cost of financial distress, lowering tax liability and avoiding 
suboptimal investment policies, hedging can increase the expected value of a company. The 
second one is the managerial utility maximization hypothesis, which includes signaling of 
managerial skill, managerial risk aversion and alternatives to hedging as controls, such as 
preserving liquid assets and reducing leverage. Tufano also presents a theory regarding hedging 
strategies and their relation to firm value. It states that using financial derivatives can diminish 
firm value when agency costs between shareholders and managers exist. 
The following passages examine some of the research undertaken on the predictability of 
hedging principles on determinants and incentives. 
Nance et al. (1993) observed that firms that possess tax schedules with greater convexity 
hedge more. Those that utilize financial instruments possess more tax credits and a greater 
amount of their income is in the progressive section of the tax schedule. Their observations are 
consistent with the tax convexity models presented by Smith and Stulz (1985). Nance et al. also 
mention that their results are consistent with the opinion that hedging and other financial risk 
management related policies are substitutes. They found that MNCs that utilize hedging 
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instruments possess fewer liquid assets and higher dividends, and these observations are 
consistent with the findings of Nance et al. (1993). 
Graham and Rogers (2002), in contrast, found no evidence that companies that hedge to 
decrease their projected tax liability when their tax functions are convex; this finding goes 
against the observations of Nance et al. (1993). Graham and Rogers’ analysis suggests that an 
MNC hedges to increase debt capacity which, in turn, increases tax benefits. 
Gay and Nam (1998) examined the incentives behind financial derivatives usage by 
closely analyzing the underinvestment premise proposed by Froot et al. (1993). They observed 
that there exists a positive relation between a firm’s usage of these instruments and its growth 
opportunities. For firms with more investment opportunities, their use is greater when they also 
possess fairly low cash reserves. Gay and Nam’s observations support the shareholder 
maximization and underinvestment hypothesis. 
Dadalt et al. (2002) findings confirm that the use of financial instruments and the level of 
their usage are linked with lower asymmetric information. They comment that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts possess greater accuracy and lower dispersion. These findings support DeMarzo and 
Duffie’s (1995) argument that hedging decreases the statistical noise associated with exogenous 
factors and reduces the level of asymmetric information concerning a firm’s earnings. 
By examining gold producers, Tufano (1996) observed that the theories of managerial 
risk aversion appeared more explanatory than those principles behind shareholder value 
maximization. They noticed that mining executives who possessed more stock options managed 
less risk than those who owned more company shares. Also, MNCs with lower cash reserves 
managed more price risk. These findings are consistent with the managerial utility hypothesis. 
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) noticed that increases in executive compensation is 
positively correlated with rises in derivatives usage by firms while compensation in the form of 
salary, stock options and bonus(es) is adversely related to financial hedging. Management 
remuneration in the form of stock aligns the interests of management with the ongoing welfare of 
the MNC and increases hedging activity. Payment in the form of stock options rewards risk and 
reduces hedging activity. Their conclusions are comparable to the findings of Tufano (1996). 
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The central theme of the cited research findings is that an active hedging policy increases 
a firm’s value when market imperfections such as underinvestment problems, convex tax 
schedules, and/or bankruptcy costs are prevalent. These studies also provided conflicting results 
regarding whether or not financial hedging achieves satisfactory economic objectives. The 
following passage outlines various empirical tests that have been undertaken on the relation 
between hedging utilizing financial derivatives and firm value. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) studied the usage of currency derivatives and analyzed 
their impact from hedging on a firm’s value by utilizing the Tobin’s Q ratio. They found 
substantial evidence that the use of these financial instruments is positively linked with a firm’s 
market value and that companies that face exchange risk and who utilize such derivatives have 
nearly five percent higher value than those that do not use them. Their findings also suggest that 
MNCs that possess an active hedging policy experience an increase in value greater than those 
entities that decide to remain unhedged. Furthermore, those firms that choose to terminate their 
hedging policies experience a decline in value relative to those that decide to continue observing 
their hedging policy. These observations are consistent with empirical studies that propose active 
hedging increases firm value. Results from univariate and multivariate tests between derivatives 
users and non-users point out that companies who possess high growth prospects but low 
accessibility to financing are more likely to utilize derivatives for hedging purposes. Their 
findings are consistent with those of Froot et al. (1993). 
Berrospide et al. (2010) also studied the effect of currency derivatives hedging on 
corporate performance and value. They noticed that hedging allows companies to increase their 
capital expenditures and to also smooth their investment policies. Their findings show that a 
firm’s foreign debt capacity increases when it utilizes financial derivatives and it also adds to its 
firm value from tax shield. They concluded that currency hedging is positively correlated with 
firm value, and their findings are supported by Allayannis and Weston’s (2001) research. 
Carter et al. (2006) examined the U.S. airline industry to observe the relation between 
hedging and firm value. They determined that jet fuel hedging is positively correlated to an 
airline’s firm value and that most of the hedging premium is attributed to the interaction between 
hedging and investment. Carter et al. emphasize that the main benefit of fuel hedging by carriers 
comes from a decrease in underinvestment costs. 
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Adam and Fernando (2006) examined a group of gold mining companies and they found 
that those that hedge generate positive cash flows that are economically and statistically 
significant. This suggests that derivatives usage for such mitigating purposes boosts shareholder 
value. Their findings also show that the majority of the cash flow increase seems to stem from 
positive realized risk premium. 
Jin and Jorion (2006), having analyzed a sample of U.S. oil and gas producers, found that 
hedging did not seem to affect an energy firm’s market value; however, they confirm that 
hedging does reduce a firm’s price sensitivity to oil and gas prices which is opposite to 
Allayannis and Weston’s (2001) findings. 
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) also investigated the usage of financial derivatives by over 
1700 companies whose headquarters were situated in the U.S. and they observed that those with 
greater agency and monitoring issues display a negative correlation between derivatives usage 
and Tobin’s Q. This indicates that the use of derivatives for hedging purposes has a negative 
impact on firm value for entities that display greater agency and monitoring issues. Their 
findings are consistent with those of Tufano (1998) but conflict with the observations of 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995). 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, hedging is a purely financial decision. Their 
hypothesis states that financial policy can not affect firm value in the absence of market 
imperfection which suggests that there is no incentive for hedging. In contrast, a number of 
researchers point out observations that can be considered as factors or incentives inherent in 
financial hedging decision-making policies; their collective empirical testing demonstrate that 
there is indeed a relation between financial hedging and firm market value. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), Hagelin et al. (2004), Carter 
et al. (2006), Adam and Fernando (2006) and Berrospide et al. (2008) found a positive relation 
between hedging with derivatives and firm value. Mello and Parsons (2000), Lookman (2004), 
Dan et al. (2005), Jin and Jorion (2006), and Fauver and Naranjo (2010), conversely, found 
either zero, conditional or adverse relation between hedging and firm market value. Such 
conflicting conclusions indicate that researchers possess mixed views. It also suggests that 
further research is necessary to understand this association (or lack of). 
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3.0 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We obtained quarterly financial data of oil, gas and mining companies that are listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) with a market capitalization of over $500 million CAD as of 
9/30/2013. Our analysis is based on a sample of 47 publicly-traded resource companies (18 
mining companies and 29 oil & gas producers), or 1199 quarterly end-of-period observations 
over the period 12/30/2005 to 9/30/2013. 
We only analyze companies that meet the following criteria: financial statements/reports 
are available from SEDAR (System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval); Market 
Value of Equity is available on a quarterly-end basis; and there is sufficient company data 
needed to conduct the necessary analysis. 
Following the Allayannis and Weston (2001) model, the dependent variable is firm value, 
proxied by the Tobin’s Q (TQ) ratio. We calculate it as Book Value of Total Assets plus Market 
Value of Common Shares less Book Value of Common Shares scaled by Book Value of Total 
Assets. Market Value of Common Shares was calculated by multiplying the Share Price by the 
number of Shares Outstanding. Companies with high Tobin’s Qs or with Qs greater than one 
have been found to be better investment opportunities (Lang et al., 1989), possess higher growth 
potential (Tobin and Brainard, 1968; Tobin, 1969) and indicate management has performed well 
with the assets under their command (Lang et al., 1989). The ability to apply Tobin’s Q, as either 
an ancillary or indicator of firm success, is of value in a real-world setting. 
Firms-quarters with negative Qs or with Qs in excess of ten are excluded to reduce 
measurement error. Abel and Eberly (2002) uses a similar selection criterion, excluding Qs less 
than zero or greater than five. 
The five independent variables as factors of firm value are firm size (FSze), profitability 
(ROA), leverage (LEV), growth options (GroOp), and financial constraints (FinCon), which were 
discussed in length by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis et al. (2012). 
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It is still uncertain if firm size impacts firm value. According to Nance et al. (1993), 
larger companies are more likely to utilize financial derivatives to hedge; however, Cabral’s 
(1995) findings suggest that Tobin’s Q is negatively related to size when MNCs are in the initial 
stages of growth and they spend a great deal as sunk costs. 
MNCs tend to face many market exposures and are therefore more likely to utilize 
financial derivatives. Prior studies provide evidence as to whether firm size can indeed increase 
accounting profitability for firms. Nance et al. (1993) point out that corporate financial risk 
management could be positively correlated to firm size because economies of scale may apply to 
operational and transaction costs of hedging. Larger firms are more likely to use financial 
derivatives to mitigate their market price exposures than smaller companies since larger entities 
can afford the large fixed start-up costs of hedging. Consequently, it is necessary to control for 
size. The log of Total Assets will be used as the proxy for firm size. The purpose of taking the 
log of Total Assets is that the assets amount of some large firms are much greater than those of 
small companies which can skew the results of the analysis. 
Profitability is considered a significant determinant of firm value. Profitable publicly-
traded corporations are more likely to trade at a premium than lesser ones, and thus increasing a 
firm’s market value. Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) observe that profitable MNCs may want 
to “lock in” the effects of their rising profitability through hedging; therefore, the greater the 
profitability of a hedger the higher their respective Tobin’s Qs should be. The relation between 
Return on Assets (ROA) and the Tobin’s Q ratio is expected to be positive. We use ROA, 
calculated as Net Income divided by Total Assets, as a proxy for profitability. 
Leverage is used for firm’s capital structure, which could also be related to firm value. 
Increasing a firm’s debt can be considered a double-edge sword since a rising leverage ratio can 
be beneficial, yet harmful at the same time. We calculate leverage as the ratio of Total Debt to 
Shareholders’ Equity (D/E). When calculating it, we prefer to use the market value of debt and 
equity rather than the book value since book value often understates current value. A high D/E 
ratio implies that the firm has been aggressively financing its activities through debt and 
therefore must pay interest on this financing. If the company’s assets generate a greater return 
than the interest payments, then the company can generate greater earnings than it would without 
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the debt. If not, however, and the company’s debt outweighs the return from its assets, then the 
debt cost may outweigh the Return on Assets. Over the long-term, this could lead to bankruptcy. 
Myers (1977) and Smith and Watts (1992) have found that future investment prospects 
affect firm value. According to Myers, the value of the MNC is dependent on future investment 
growth. The consequence of hedging can ease the issue of cash shortfall when taking on future 
investment projects. Specifically, hedging can resolve underinvestment issues through the use of 
financial derivatives hedging as outlined by Froot et al. (1993). Hedgers are therefore more likely 
to have adequate cash reserves and take advantage of larger investment opportunities which in 
turn implies they could possess higher Tobin’s Q ratios. We use Net Capital Spending scaled by 
Sales as a proxy for growth options. Net Capital Spending was calculated by deducting Net 
Fixed Assets (Beginning) from Net Fixed Assets (Ending) and adding Depreciation (Ending). 
Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that firms without access to capital markets will have a 
higher Tobin’s Q since they will only take on projects with positive net present value. In 
addition, Fazzari et al. (1988) mentioned that the greater the dividend yield, the lower is the 
probability that the company is financially constrained. In order to control for a firm’s financial 
constraints we include a dummy variable to signify whether or not it pays dividends during a 
particular year. It is set to 1 if it paid dividends and 0 otherwise. We expect on average a 
negative correlation between dividends and a firm’s Tobin’s Q value. 
Hedging information for each company in the sample can be obtained from their 
respective annual financial reports. To make the distribution of hedging variable more 
symmetric, we use the log of the fair value of derivative financial assets (FHdg) as a proxy for a 
firm’s hedging variable. To control this variable, we set the hedge dummy (HdgDum) to 1 for 
firms that hedge and 0 for those that do not. 
We excluded the following independent variables that appeared in past research studies:  
 Industrial Effects since the sample size consists of firms operating in similar 
sectors; 
 Credit Rating since reliable and sufficient firm ratings data cannot be found either 
in annual reports or in accessible databases; and 
 Tax Convexity given that if effective marginal tax rates on corporate entities are 
an increasing function of their pre-tax value then the after-tax value of the firm is 
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a convex function of its pre-tax value (Smith and Stulz, 1985). They further 
observed that if hedging decreases the variability of pre-tax corporate values, the 
expected corporate tax liability is subsequently reduced and the expected post-tax 
value of the firm is increased so long as the cost of the hedge is not excessive. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
According to Allayannis and Weston (2001), companies that hedge possess a larger 
Tobin’s Q value. To test this claim, the main hypothesis can be expressed as: 
H0: Hedging increases firm value. 
Ha: Hedging does not increase (no impact on) firm value. 
 
We estimated the hedging premium by regressing firm market value on hedging practice, 
controlling for the independent factors that are considered to be correlated to firm value. A 
number of multivariate regressions were carried out on the sample data set.  
The empirical model is expressed as follows: 
TQ = β0 + β1(HdgDum) + β2(FHdg) + βX(X) + ε 
 
where TQ refers to an entity’s firm value in a given quarter, HdgDum is the hedge dummy, FHdg 
represents a firm’s hedge variable, X is the set of control variables (firm size (FSze); profitability 
(ROA); leverage (LEV); growth options (GroOp); and financial constraints (FinCon)), and ε is 
the error term. 
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4.0 Empirical Analysis 
 
Table One - Descriptive Statistics 
The values are separated by firms that used hedging and those that do not in a given quarter. The data from the 
consolidated balance sheets discussed above were then used to create the dependent variable Firm Value (TQ). Five 
independent variables as determinants of firm value were also calculated: Firm Size (FSze), Profitability (ROA), 
Leverage (LEV), Growth Options (GroOp), and Financial Constraints (FinCon). A dummy variable for Hedging 
was also used (HdgDum); 1 was used for hedging companies and 0 for non-hedging companies. To make the 
distribution of hedging variable more symmetric, we also used the log of fair value of derivative financial assets 
(FHdg) recognized in financial statement as a proxy for a firm’s hedging variables. 
 
                          
  Panel Full Sample: Mining / Oil & Gas                 
  A     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.664 0.518 0.624 3.390 6.233 0.784 6.331 0.622   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.525 0.500 0.922 0.727 10.125 0.444 149.945 0.485   
                          
    Number of Observations: 1199                 
                          
 
                          
  Panel Full Sample: Mining                   
  B     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.568 0.537 0.796 3.466 5.953 0.598 15.504 0.545   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.377 0.499 1.040 0.662 11.686 0.392 244.472 0.498   
                          
    Number of Observations: 451                 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
                          
  Panel Full Sample: Oil & Gas                   
  C     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.722 0.507 0.519 3.345 6.402 0.896 0.800 0.668   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.612 0.500 0.827 0.761 9.067 0.436 1.594 0.471   
                          
    
Number of 
Observations: 748                 
                          
 
                          
  Panel Sample: Mining  (HEDGED)                 
  D     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.966 1.000 1.484 3.677 7.508 0.620 0.782 0.669   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.356 0.000 0.998 0.626 12.664 0.321 2.585 0.471   
                          
    Number of Observations: 242                 
                          
 
                          
  Panel Sample: Mining  (UNHEDGED)                 
  E     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.107 0.000 0.000 3.222 4.151 0.573 32.549 0.402   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.323 0.000 0.000 0.618 10.175 0.460 358.819 0.491   
                          
    Number of Observations: 209                 
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  Panel Sample: Oil & Gas  (HEDGED)                 
  F     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.518 1.000 1.025 3.248 5.912 0.884 0.871 0.681   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.716 0.000 0.912 0.621 9.001 0.385 1.531 0.467   
                          
    
Number of 
Observations: 379                 
                          
 
                          
  Panel Sample: Oil & Gas  (UNHEDGED)               
  G     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.931 0.000 0.000 3.444 6.905 0.908 0.727 0.656   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.488 0.000 0.000 0.872 9.120 0.484 1.655 0.476   
                          
    Number of Observations: 369                 
                          
 
                          
  Panel Sample: Mining / Oil & Gas  (HEDGED)               
  H     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.693 1.000 1.204 3.415 6.534 0.781 0.837 0.676   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.589 0.000 0.972 0.657 10.599 0.383 2.007 0.468   
                          
    Number of Observations: 621                 
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  Panel Sample: Mining / Oil & Gas  (UNHEDGED)               
  I     TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon   
    Mean   4.633 0.000 0.000 3.363 5.909 0.787 12.233 0.564   
                          
    Standard Deviation 2.460 0.000 0.000 0.796 9.598 0.502 215.983 0.496   
                          
    Number of Observations: 578                 
                          
 
Table One presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample (Panels A) and for the 
sub-samples of resource firms with and without hedging (Panels B - I). The variables and their 
sources are defined in Table One. 
The mean estimates are: of firm value, 4.664; of size (in log), 3.390; of profitability, 
6.233%; of leverage, 0.784; of growth options, 6.331%; of financial constraints, 0.622; and 
nearly 52% of the time companies are hedging. Interestingly, comparing both the mining and oil 
& gas sectors, companies that hedge do not necessarily possess a higher leverage than their non-
hedging counterparts (Panels H and I), while hedging entities show a slightly higher firm value 
and greater financial constraint than their non-hedging equivalents. 
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Table Two - Hedge Usage and Firm Value
* indicating the significance at the 5% level
 
Panel A reports the results from the multivariate regressions without the independent Hedge variables (HdgDum 
and FHdg) while Panel B displays the results from the regressions with the Hedge variables. 
 
Panel A 
Without Hedge Dummy     
        
Sectors: Mining and Oil & Gas     
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -0.82289 -2.57187 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.21808 11.57311 
Profitability (ROA)   0.05306 8.93063 
Leverage (LEV)   0.37353 2.68919 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.00020 0.51368 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 1.17767 6.87717 
No. of Obs.   1199   
F stat*   157.57234   
Adjusted R Square   0.39521   
 
Without Hedge Dummy     
        
Sector: Mining       
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -0.47631 -0.70248 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.16063 5.22567 
Profitability (ROA)   0.04300 5.36695 
Leverage (LEV)   0.43188 1.70245 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.00009 0.24044 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 0.92841 3.01395 
No. of Obs.   451   
F stat*   46.61655   
Adjusted R Square   0.33636   
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Without Hedge Dummy     
        
Sector: Oil & Gas       
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -1.24428 -3.29646 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.28537 10.25476 
Profitability (ROA)   0.06391 7.18331 
Leverage (LEV)   0.32024 1.79336 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.10028 2.15552 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 1.33271 5.98097 
No. of Obs.   748   
F stat*   113.55731   
Adjusted R Square   0.42968   
 
Panel B 
With Hedge Dummy     
        
Sectors: Mining and Oil & Gas     
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -0.61629 -1.77806 
Hedge Dummy (HdgDum) -0.26329 -1.67687 
Hedge Variable (FHdg) 0.08256 0.88967 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.18229 10.79179 
Profitability (ROA)   0.05306 8.93248 
Leverage (LEV)   0.36654 2.63346 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.00016 0.42798 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 1.18621 6.77905 
No. of Obs.   1199   
F stat*   113.05887   
Adjusted R Square   0.39569   
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With Hedge Dummy     
        
Sector: Mining       
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -0.09930 -0.13657 
Hedge Dummy (HdgDum) -0.37390 -1.41696 
Hedge Variable (FHdg) 0.23358 1.60544 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.06744 4.46648 
Profitability (ROA)   0.04253 5.26211 
Leverage (LEV)   0.39554 1.55444 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.00005 0.12197 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 0.90245 2.92828 
No. of Obs.   451   
F stat*   33.75522   
Adjusted R Square   0.33754   
 
With Hedge Dummy     
        
Sector: Oil & Gas       
        
Variable Name   β Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept   -1.10559 -2.63639 
Hedge Dummy (HdgDum) -0.14442 -0.72856 
Hedge Variable (FHdg) -0.00116 -0.00907 
Firm Size (Fsze)   1.26027 9.70430 
Profitability (ROA)   0.06295 6.96394 
Leverage (LEV)   0.31720 1.77483 
Growth Options (GroOp) 0.10192 2.17782 
Financial Constraints (FinCon) 1.37252 5.81475 
No. of Obs.   748   
F stat*   81.13767   
Adjusted R Square   0.42888   
 
Table Two reports the regression results of resource firms with and without hedging with 
regards to a set of firm-specific variables that have been shown to be important determinants in 
prior studies. The adjusted R-squared values (for the mining and oil & gas combined sectors) 
show that approximately 39.57% of the variance of a firm’s value can be explained by these 
independent variables along with the hedge variables. 
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Based on the multivariate regression results, a model to predict the changes in firm value 
in the next fiscal quarter can be expressed as: 
Firm Value = β0 + β1(Hedge Dummy) + β2(Hedge Variable) + β3(Firm Size) + 
β4(Profitability) + β5(Leverage) + β6(Growth Options) + β7(Financial Constraints) 
 
Based on the above data in Table Two the hedging equation (for the mining and oil & gas 
combined sectors) can be written as: 
Firm Value = (-0.61629) – 0.26329*(Hedge Dummy) + 0.08256*(Hedge 
Variable) + 1.18229*(Firm Size) + 0.05306*(Profitability) + 0.36654*(Leverage) 
+ 0.00016*(Growth Options) + 1.18621*(Financial Constraints) 
 
Contrary to the proposed observation that hedging increases firm value, we do not find a 
positive relation between them, as measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio. In fact, the relationship 
appears negative. Specifically, the negative regression coefficient, β1, implies a negative 
correlation, holding all other variables constant, between firm value and a proactive hedging 
policy in the resource sectors. Our study is in line with the findings of Jin and Jorion (2006), who 
find no association between derivatives hedging and firm value for a sample of oil and gas 
producers. Jin and Jorion (2007) also found no positive relationship between hedging activity 
and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q when analyzing the gold mining industry. 
The regression coefficient β3 = 1.18229 is positive, so for every unit increase in Firm Size 
an increase of 1.18229 in Firm Value is predicted, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, 
Profitability and Leverage are positive. Consequently, for every unit increase in these two 
variables an increase of 0.05306 and 0.36654 in Firm Value is predicted, respectively. It is 
important to mention that profitability is statistically significant at the five percent level, meaning 
the higher the profit, the higher the value of the firm. This is consistent with corporate valuation 
theory. Finally, Growth Options and Financial Constraints are also positive. 
Similar observations can be made when analyzing the hedging linear multivariate 
equations for just the mining companies and also the sub-sample of energy producers. 
 22 
 
Table Three - Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
 
Industries: Mining and Oil & Gas           
  TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon 
TQ 1               
HdgDum 0.0118 1             
FHdg 0.2314 0.6525 1           
FSze 0.5362 0.0356 0.3723 1         
ROA 0.3248 0.0309 0.0738 0.1007 1       
LEV 0.2712 -0.0068 0.0861 0.2347 0.1697 1     
GroOp -0.0435 -0.0380 -0.0254 -0.0732 -0.0759 -0.0334 1   
FinCon 0.5455 0.1158 0.3845 0.6616 0.2943 0.3870 -0.0490 1 
 
Industry: Mining           
  TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon 
TQ 1               
HdgDum 0.1805 1             
FHdg 0.3549 0.7122 1           
FSze 0.5135 0.3432 0.5705 1         
ROA 0.2876 0.1434 0.1719 0.1028 1       
LEV 0.2612 0.0599 0.1938 0.2631 0.1427 1     
GroOp -0.0720 -0.0649 -0.0470 -0.1361 -0.1049 -0.0320 1   
FinCon 0.5093 0.2679 0.4799 0.7771 0.1737 0.3857 -0.0665 1 
 
Industry: Oil & Gas           
  TQ HdgDum FHdg FSze ROA LEV GroOp FinCon 
TQ 1               
HdgDum -0.0791 1             
FHdg 0.1630 0.6202 1           
FSze 0.5536 -0.1285 0.2405 1         
ROA 0.3586 -0.0548 -0.0141 0.1060 1       
LEV 0.2844 -0.0280 0.1109 0.2834 0.1972 1     
GroOp -0.0907 0.0454 0.0205 -0.1734 -0.1389 -0.0987 1   
FinCon 0.5700 0.0265 0.3563 0.6291 0.3954 0.3625 -0.2116 1 
 
Table Three presents a correlation matrix of the main variables for each sample and sub-
sample analysis. The independent variables are noticeably correlated to one another and more so 
to firm value. 
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5.0 Findings and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examined the impact of financial hedging on firm value for a sample of 
publicly-traded mining, oil and gas companies that are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
Among the five control variables, Firm Size, Profitability and Financial Constraints 
enhanced the value of the firm both statistically and significantly at the five percent level. 
Predictably, firm’s profitability and investment growth are positively related to the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, indicating that firms with higher profitability and higher growth potentials are rewarded 
with higher Q ratios. In addition, Q ratios seem to be positively related to firm size among the 
sampled firms. We also observed that financial constraints are positively related to the Q ratio. 
Contrary to the argument that an active financial risk management policy increases firm 
value, we do not find a positive relation between them. In fact, the relationship appears negative. 
This finding is inconsistent with theories denoting that hedging increases firm value. In these 
sectors, commodity price exposures are transparent and easy to hedge by investors; hence, there 
is no reason to expect that resource firms hedging their commodity (production) price risk should 
have higher market values. 
Our observations are in line with the conclusions of Jin and Jorion (2006), who found no 
relation between financial hedging and firm value for a sample of energy producers. Within the 
analyzed oil and gas sectors, these results support the assumptions of Tufano (1996) who also 
found little empirical support for theories claiming that hedging stems from firm value 
maximization motives. Instead, Tufano shows that hedging appears to be driven mainly by 
managerial risk aversion. 
Stulz (1984) argues that corporate risk management is an outgrowth of the risk aversion 
of managers. While outside shareholders’ ability to diversify will effectively make them 
unconcerned to the amount of hedging activity undertaken, the same cannot be said for 
executives, whose human capital and wealth are poorly diversified. Such lack of diversification 
can result from managers having firm specific human capital that results in a relatively large 
portion of the firm’s stock held by them. Thus, risk management initiated by managerial 
incentives may not be beneficial to shareholders and may decrease firm value. 
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Smith and Stulz (1985) claim that shareholders hire executives because they have 
specialized resources that increase the value of the firm. Managers cannot use their expertise 
unless they have some discretion in the choice of their actions. Yet, unless faced with proper 
incentives, they will not maximize shareholder wealth. Their compensation contract must be 
designed so that when they increase the value of the firm, their expected utility also rises. 
If Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano (1996), Jin and Jorion (2006), and Jin 
and Jorion (2007) are correct, there should be no association between hedging and firm value, 
which is confirmed by our empirical analysis. 
As in the energy sector, the commodity price risk of mining companies is easy to identify 
and hedge. Hedging at the firm level does not confer special advantages. Even if there was a risk 
premium in forward contracts, such premium can easily be captured by investors (Jin and Jorion, 
2006). The firm environment is closer to that described by the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance 
conditions proposition. Under such conditions, it is hard to understand how hedging price risk 
can increase firm value. 
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